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if we can, how Congress and the courts,
md the Board itself, can better review
und control its operations.
In the area of labor law, and as respects the Board's role in it, every man
may be a partisan. But I hope that these
hearings will be received in the same
impartial spirit in which they will be
conducted. This is an opportunity to
criticize honestly where criticism is warranted, and to praise where praise is deserved. Our objective is to do what we
can to improve the operations of the
NLRB, administrative agencies in general, and the Government as a whole.
We shall rely upon witnesses not only to
analyze the role of the Board in terms
of the poiicit's established by Congress,
but also to suggest practical methods by
which congressional and judicial oversight of this administrative agency and
the others can be improved.
The subcommittee has invited a number of scholars and other experts in
administrative law and labor relations to
testify at the hearings. In addition, we
shall hear from representatives of management, labor, and the Board itself.
Among those who are presently scheduled to testify or present statements are
Profs. Derek Bok and Louis Jaffe of the
Harvard Law School, Prof. Archibald
Cox of the Harvard Law School and
fonnerly Solicitor General of the United
States, Prof. Howard Lesnick of the University of Pennsylvania, Pwf. Harry H.
Wellington of Yale Law School, and Prof.
Cornelius •J. Peck of the University of
Washington, Seattle.
Because of the widespread interest in
these hearings it may not be possible
to bear every person who wishes to testify. However, the subcommittee will
make every effort to accommodate those
who wish to submit statements for the
record. All persons desiring to present
testimony or submit written statements
should contact the subcommittee office,
room 1403, New Senate Office Building.
NOTICE OF HEARING ON PROPOSED
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1968
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I want
to give notice that open public hearings
on the proposed new Internal Security
Act of 1968-S. 2988-will begin at 10:30
a.m. on February 27, and will continue
through a period of several weeks thereafter. Any person wishing to testify on
this bill should communicate with the
clerk on the Committee on the Judiciary,
Mr. John Holloman, or the chief counsel
of the Internal Security Subcommittee,
Mr. Jay Sourwine. Anyone wishing to
present a prepared statement should submit a copy of the statement to the subcommittee at least 24 hours before the
date scheduled for his appearance.
Written statements for inclusion in the
record, but not intended to be presented
orally, may be submitted at any time
during the course of the hearings, and
will be admitted to the hearing record if
found pertinent and not excessive in
length.
The hearing on Tuesday, February 27,
will be held In room 3304 in the New
Senate Office Building.

ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED
The Secretary of the Senate. reported
that on today, February 26, 1968, he
presented to the President Qf the United
States the enrolled bill (~ 269) to authorize an exchange of lands at Acadia
National Park, Maine.
ORD~R OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if no
one wishes to speak at this moment, I
should like to speak for about 5 minutes
if I may.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Montana is recognized, although
the Chair has a request from the Senator
from Alaska.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, may we ha~e order in the Chamber?
The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Senator from Montana withhold for just one
moment. The Chair must insist that the
Chamber be in order and that the galleries be quiet. The Senator from Montana seeks recognition.
The Senator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
for several additional minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objectiDn, it is so ord£red.

VIETNAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last
week, U Thant, the Secretary General
of the United Nations, met for an hour
with President Johnson at the White
House. It is safe to assume that the subject matter discussed was the possibility
of negotiations covering a cessation of
hostilities or an epding of the war in
Vietnam. What came aut of tqat meeting
in the way of concensus or agreement,
I do not know but, again, I think it is
safe to assume that both men expressed
. a desire for peace and covered, in their
discussion, various ways, means, and
possibilities for achieving it.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the Senate still is not in order.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's
position is well taken. The Senator from
Montana will suspend. The Chair must
ask the doorkeepers to see that order is
maintained in the galleries when the
Senate is in session.
The Senate will please be in order.
The Senator from Montana may proceed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, over
the weekend, U Thant held a press conference in which he stated what seems
to me to be the reasonable belief that
talks could begin shortly after the United
States calls off the bombing of North
Vietnam.
Over the weekend also, there have
been, more and more, speculative stories
coming out of Saigon, Bangkok, and
Washington to the effect that the President would soon ask for an increase of
anywhere up to 100,000 men in Vietnam. It is anticipated-again, accor<Ung
to speculation-that when Gen. Earl
Wheeler, Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, returns to Washington this
week, he will make a. recommendation
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that our forces be increased in Vietnam
beyond the present ceiling of 525,000
men by July 1.
Therefore, it appears to me that this
country may be facing, on the one hand,
a pressure to increase. its commitment of
military personnel in Vietnam again
and perhaps again, and again; and, on
the other, the need to make further and
more intensive efforts to reach the negotiating table on the basis of views such
as those advanced by U Thant. It 1s my
hope that more attention would be given
to what U Thant has proposed than
seems to have been the case up to this
time. His views are entitled to the most
deliberate consideration not so much because of the immediate situation in Vietnam, but because of the difficulties and
dilemmas which have been present since
the very beginning of the confiict.
Even though it appears to pre~~ent military questions, I believe that U Thant's
proposal to halt the bombing of North
Vietnam can be given consideration for a.
number of reasons: First, there are very ·
few significant targets left in North
Vietnam; second, the bombing has not
halted the infiltration of men and supplies in South Vietnam; and third, the
bombing has failed to bring Hanoi to the
conference table.
A halt to the bombing of the North
would not, and should not weaken the
air support of the U.S. forces along the
17th parallel and most particularly at
Khe Sanh. These ground forces, without
question, must continue to have all possible air support not only along the 17th
parallel in Vietnam itself but across the
infiltration routes which extend through
Laos. Wherever else in is needed in conjunction with ground-force operations,
air support must be forthcoming.
It is my belief, however, that U Thant's
suggestion makes sense because a way
around the impasse which confronts us
in Vietnam will not be found by milltar,y
means but will have to be brought about
through negotiations. If on the one hand
the Soviet Union and China a.re to continue ad infinitum to supply North Vietnam with the most sophisticated weapons and other forms of assistance, and
if we are to continue the same policy in
relation to South Vietnam, then I think
there lies ahead, not only for this, country
but also for the rest of the world, far
more troublous days than ha.s been the
case to date.
Therefore, I would hope, Mr. President, that, instead of an obsessive pursuit of a solution by a continual escalation of manpower commitments, we
would think about escalating our peace
efforts in an effort to find an honorable
settlement-irrespective of considerations of face.
No one can say that to halt the bombing of the north, as U Thant has proposed, will bring about fruitful negotiations, but it is a proposal worth trying
as a step toward peace. Indeed, it may
well have more merit than going another rung of military escalation in the
hope that it will end the bloodshed, especially since every previous step-up has
produced, not peace, but simply a more
open ended. more destructive, and more
dev11Stating war.
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I refer once again, too, to the proposal made by our distinguished colleague, the. Senator from Kentucky [Mr.
CooPER] that we confine the bombing to
the 17th parallel and to the Ho Chi Minh
trails in L'los and that we concentrate
and consolidate our effort and forces
within South Vietnam. Finally,' I would
refer, once again, to the unanimous resolution of the Senate which calls for an
open initiative in the United Nations
Security Council in an effort to delineate
a path toward peace-an initiative which
has yet to be taken. These suggestions
interrelate with the suggestion of
U Thant which, I repeat, is deserving of
our most careful and immediate consideration.
In one way or another, it seems to me,
that it is preferable to make a try for
negotiations than to continue to heed
the insatiable calls for more and more
men as the war spreads and intensifies.
To make this try, to me, is preferable to
going back to the past to find out how
we got into this barbarous war. To me,
it is preferable to concentrate on today
and to plan for tomolTOW in an effort to
find an honorable conclusion to the war
in Vietnam before it gets completely out
of hand.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the
text of U Thant's statement, published
in the New York Times on yesterday.
There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the
Rxcoao, as follows:
'IUT OP THANT'S STATEMENT ON TALKS ABOUT
VIETNAM

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., February 24.-Varl·

ous questions have been raised, and different
interpretations have been given, following
my recent talks In certain capitals. Indeed,
It Is !or me a great advantage In the dis·
charge or my respon.;lbllltles as Secretary
General o! the United Nations to be able to
meet at Intervals with leaders o! governments
and to exchange views with them.
Obviously, In the present circumstances,
the war In VIetnam has taken precedence
over all other subjects In the discussions,
simply as a result o! the increasing concern
that thls war causes the world ove~.
Although It Is !or the parties directly involved, ultimately-and, I hope, soon-to
take the steps and establish the contacts
necessary for negot.latlons, which they know
must take place I! this war Is ever to be
brought to an end The Vietnam conflict has
repercussions which extend far beyond the
parties themselves. That is why I !eel It
would be useful to present this account ot
what happened during these recent meetings.
TRAVEL DETAILS GIVEN

Some or the details or my travel have already been made public on a day-to-day
basis by the Vnlted Nations headquarters.
Nevertheless, as I feel It relevo.nt to what I
wlsh to state today, I will record them again
in the order In which they took place.
As Is known, I took the opportunity durIng a brief visit to New Delhi In connection
with the second session of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development to
meet the .C onsul General o! the Democratic
Republic of VleLnam [North VIetnam], Mr.
Nguyen Hoa, on Feb. 8, and to discuss with
him the question or VIetnam.
The consul general affirmed that his government "would bold talks with Washington on all relevant matters nt an appropriate
time after the unconditional cessation of
bombing and o! all other acts of war against
the Democratic Republic of VIetnam."

He drew my attention to the statement
that had been made on this subject the day
before [Feb. 7] by the Foreign Minister of the
Democratic Republlc of VIetnam In an In•
tervlew with a press agency, which said, In
particular, that talks wlll begin as soon as
the United States has proved that It has
really unconditionally stopped the bombing.
I then put to him some questions which he
promised to transmit to his Government, assuring me that It would reply to these questions as soon as possible.

preach to it. If the Vietnam question Is seen
as a contest ot unyielding will, there can be
no solution.
In the broader context It appears. lndee<!•.
that both the United States and the Soviet
Union are firmly determined to prevent the
defeat of the side which each supports If
such a trend continues, the conclusion Is
Inescapable that there wtll be continued Intensification and escalation of the conflict,
resulting in unforeseeable developments with
dire consequences.

FLEW ON TO MOSCOW

EARLY TALKS EXPECTED

Wh!le In New Delhi, I called on the PresiOn the other hand, my recent contacts have
dent of India, Dr. Zalctl' Husain, and bad confirmed my view that, If essential steps are
several meetings with the Prime Minister of taken, they will lead to a chain of events
which, In the end, can bring about a just
India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.
From there I Hew to Moscow where I was solution to the problem, and which wlll saye
received by the secretary general or the Com- both South VIetnam and North VIetnam
munist party, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev; the from devastation and virtual destruction and
chairman of the counc!l of ministers, Pre- will offer a chance for the people of VIetnam
mier Aleksel Kosygln, President Nikolai V. to regain a sense of national identity and to
Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei A. reconstruct their war-torn country.
Everywhere I found a genuine desire to
Gromyko.
In London, I was received by Prime Min- bring this tragic conflict to an end. The InIster Harold Wilson and had dlscW!Sions with creased Intensity of the hostllltlea during the
him, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Com- past few weeb should not lead to the conmonwealth Secretary George Thomson; the clusion that tl:.e door Is cl06ed tor negotiaMinister o! State, Lord Chalfont, and the tions.
In my view, the Indispensable first step
leader of the Opposition, Mr. Edward Heath.
Wb!le in London, on Feb. 13, I was In- ot ending all bombing and other acts of war
formed tbo.t the delegate general o! the Dem- against the Democratic Republic of VIetnam
ocratic Republic o! VIetnam In France, Mr. should be taken and could be taken without
Mal Van Bo, bad just received a message too great a. military risk. If such a step were
from his Government !or transmits! to me. to be taken, I am more than ever convinced
This was the reply to the questions I had that meaningful talks wtll take place much
submitted In New Delhi. I left !or Paris on earlier than Is generally supposed, even perthe 14th and saw Mr Mal Van Bo, who con- haps wlthln a matter of a few days. ,
veyed to me the reply from his Government,
.o\5 tor the questions concerning the coDduct of the fighting after the unconditional
dated Feb. 13, to my questions.
In this message, there was a further clari- cessation of the bombing, partlclularly in the
fication of Hanoi's position concerning dls- demilitarized zone and acrOM the frontiers,
cUBSlons with Washington. I was told that It can reasonably be assumed that these will
the Democratic Republic or Vietnam would be dealt with 1n good faith. The parties themhold talks with the United States at the ap- selves should solve this problem In order to
propriate time, that is, as soon as the uncon- allow for the larger negotiations to take
ditional cessation of bombing and or all other place, with the participation o! all parties
acts of war against the Democratic Republic concerned, including the Government of the
or VIetnam became effective.
Republic of Vietnam and the National Llbero.tlon Front of South VIetnam.
ANY TOPIC ADMISSIBLE
ATMOSPHERE POISONED
I was further informed that, at the talks,
The VIetnam war has already poisoned the
the United States could bring up any matters for discussion In the same way as the atmosphere and strained International relaDemocratic Republic of VIetnam could tions. This strain Is keenly felt In The United
bring up any other. In reply to my query, Nations, whose effective !unctlonlng has been
Mr. Mal Van Bo stated that the question or Impaired as a result. We are witnessing more
the reduction In the fighting In South VIet- and more the unfortunate and undesirable
nam, the question or the reconvening of the repercussions ot this war in other parts of the
Geneva Conference and any other question world.
Inasmuch as the United Nations remains
could be brought up nt the talks.
On the same day, I was received by Presi- humanity's maLo hope for peace it is my
duty,
regardless of all criticisms, to try to
dent Charles de Gaulle and Foreign MinIster Maurice Couve de Murville. Upon my reflect the oon.sensus o! International public
return to New York Feb 15, I Informed Am - oplnion and the deep concern whlch has exbo.ssador Arthur Goldberg of the substance pressed itsel! through the forum of the Gen•
ot my discussions on VIetnam during my era.! Aasembly.
Indeed, the world Is anguished and sickvisit to various countries. On Feb. 16, I conened
by
the
continued
Intensity
and savagery
ferred with the permanent observer of the
Republlc or VIetnam ( SouLh VIetnam J, Mr. of the war. It Is heart-rending to witness the
agony or the Innocent civilians who cannot
Nguyen Huu Chi.
possibly know what it Is a.ll about. Also the
On Feb. 21, I was received by President mllltary casualties steadily mount. The ugliLyndon B. Johnson and Secretary or State ness of the war Is matched only by Its !utilDean Rusk In Washington . The President Ity. There can be no victory, no defeat, only
reaffirmed his continued desire to achieve a more, su.trerlng, more death and more depeaceful settlement and the continued va- struction. The very survival of Vietnam Is
ll<tJty o! the San An ton io formu la. Both the at stake. It Is time to call a halt.
President and the Secretary o! State stressed
the no-military-advantage provision ot that
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
formula.
Senator from Montana yield?
CONVICTION REINFORCED

My talks In various capitals have reinforced my convlcLion, which I have repeo.tedly expressed In my public statements on
the Issue of VIetnam for the past three
years, namely, that the question Is essentially
a political problem which cannot be solved
through the application o! military force.
In the light or my talks, I reaffirm all that
I have said In the past concerning my assessment of the VIetnam problem and my ap-

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. I am glad that the Senator from Montana, the majority leader,
has spoken out as he has. I do not know,
and neither does anyone else here know
for sure, whether to stop the bombing of
North Vietnam would bring the war to a
conclusion in that area.
But we should know that the addition
of 100,000 men to our fighting forces in
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SoutheaSt Asia will not go very far toward bringing any war to a successful
,;lilitary conclusion.
I believe it was in the late summer of
1963 that: we were told that adding 6,000
or 7,000 men to the forces that were
then in South Vietnam, bringing that
total to 17,000, would be adequate to restore stability to that country at an early
date. In fact, it was about that time that
the Secretary of Defense predicted that
we would be bringing our forces home by
Christmas.
Next thing we knew, we had 35,000
men there. Then the increase went on
from there.
Two years ago we had 160,000 or 170,000 men in Vietnam, and we were told
1f the number were doubled-! think at
that time General Westmoreland asked
to have the number doubled, making
340,000--that would be adequate. Then
we were told it would take 500,000. Then
it went up to 525,000. Now it is up to
probably 625,000.
In my opinion, the addition of 100,000
men Is only a drop in the bucket if it is
t.he determination of the President and
the administration to bring about a military victory in Southeast Asia. One just
has to rer..d the news items to see how the
perimeter of the war is expanding. The
news this morning states that three cities
in Laos have been taken by the North
Vietnamese or the Vietcong-! do not
know which it is--but this is only a start
in that direction. We owe something to
the defense of Laos if we do to other
countries in Southeast Asia, because Laos,
in fad, has been on our team to the fullest extent--that is, Souvanna Phouma
has, anyway, even though he controls
only about half of that country. So we
may just as well be prepared.
As I said on the floor a couple of years
ago, if we are going to fight an all-owt
war in Asia, we must adopt those 1ules
and regulations that go with all-out war.
That means universal conscription. It
means a big increase in taxes. It means
wage and price controls.
The President is inadvertently responsible for the escalation in prices and
wages, because every time he asks labor
not to ask for more money, and every
time he tells industry not to raise its
prices, implying we will have wage and
price controls if they do, it is an open
invitation to raising wages and raising
prices in order to get them as high as
possible before the freeze sets in. ..
So I hope nobody is going to be fooled
by the request for 100,000 more men in
Asia if we have the idea of a complete
military victory in our miT.\ds. I would
suggest that, instead of 100,000, perhaps
another cipher be added to that figurea nd not before the ' '1."
•
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
majority leader yield, on my own time?
I have 3 minutes.
I would like to ask one question. First,
I certainly concur in what my colleagues
have said. Second, not only is the perimeter of the war expanding, but. also its
Americanization . This deeply concerns
the American people. It is more and
more our war,
I would like to ask the Senator, with
respect to the cessation of bombings as
a basis for beginning negotiations , I
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think we "missed the boat" in January
1967, when the PoiX, joined by U Thant,
and many others, asked that tbe bombing be stopped.
·
I would like to ask the Senator, who
is 1rery knowledgeable in this field, in additrion to being majority leader, if he does
not believe i1 would be a challenge to
4.merican diplomacy, on which this Government ought to concentrate, to recreate the diplomatic conditions of February 1967. In the postwar world, we have
seen that it takes the two super powers
working together to get anything done
of this nature. If the Sov1et Union joined
the call for a bombing cessation as a
basis for beginning negotiations, along
the lines of our San Antonio formula,
that would represent a situation in which
the Soviet Union's prestige is on the line
just as much as ours.
It seems to me that this is a key challenge facing the administration; this is
the basic idea on which I would like to
get the opinion of the majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I
say that Mr. Kosygin on a number of occasions has indicated that the step that
could b1ing about negotiations would be
a cessation of the bombing of the north.
Frankly, I would not care what countries were involved if we could find our
way to the negotiating table, and so I
would not be at all averse to encompassing all directly and indirectly involved, including the NLF, China, and
the Soviet Union. After all, two of those
are signatories to the Geneva accords of
1954 and 1962.
I can understand the reticence of the
administration, but we have had suggestions from the Soviet Union, Poland,
and the Pope. U Thant has just made a
trip, at which time he discussed with
various countries the possibility of
peace-in New Delhi, in Paris, where he
talked with Mal Van Bo, Mr. de Gaulle,
Mr. Couve de Murville. He has come here
and talked to the President and has indicated-he could very well have been too
optimistic--that it would bring about ne.
gotiations within several days.
I cannot see what is to be lost when we
may have a choice between having negotiations or the sending of additional tens
of thousands of our troops to Vietnam.
Now, it is all speculation so far. Nobody knows if additional troops are going
to be sent, but all indications are that
that is being considered, as a result of
a series of recent events t1iggered by
North Vietnam, as a result of incidents
t hat have taken place in 36 provincial
capitals and in other cities and hamlets
as well.
We have Marines entrenched in Khe
Sanh. Both sides are ready to jump into
battle. I do not know whether a battle is
going to occur in Khe Sanh or not, even
though all the evidence pofnts to it. I
would not obviate the possibility, nevertheless, that Giap, or whoever is responsible for the situation in the northwest
corner of South Vietnam, may be pinning down large numbers of our troops
in that area for the purpose of carrying
on activities up and down the peninsula
and up and down the 38th parallel.
We have difficulties. We do not know
how we got into the box of Vietnam. But
that is a moot question. It is too late to

FebJ"''.wry 26, 1968

decide how we got into it. The important
question is, how do we get out and how
do we get out under honorable circumstances?
Mr. AIKEN. If the Senator will yield
for another moment, I want to reiterate
that I do not know, and I do not know
of anyone else who knows, whether a
cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam would result in peace efforts within
a reasonable time or not; but we should
know that if the bombing ceases, in view
of what other count1ies have said, and
there is no honest move toward peace on
the part of Russia, China, or Vietnam,
then we could really expect a change in
world opinion, which up to now has
largely held the United States responsible for the wartime conditions which
have existed in that part of the world.
It would at least prove whether the
Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, and
their prime supporters, Russia and
China, really want peace in that area or
not. We tried, with a resolution, to get
Russia to stand up and be counted at the
United Nations, but the administration
has not seen fit to push the issue.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that the
sense of the Senate resolution should be·
used, embarrassment or not, win, lose, or
draw, because, after all, it did pass this
body unanimously, and it did express the
sense of the Senate. The P.resident, I
know, has attempted to lay the groundwork for it, but other events have intervened, and up to now, no specific action
has been taken. But I certainly hope, as
does the Senator from Vermont and every
other member of this body, regardless of
how he is classified, that the members of
the United Nations will try to do as a
body what its Secretary General, U
Thant, has tried to do on his own. I hope
that those nations which talk peace will
try to do something to bring it about.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Montana has 3 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 3 minutes to
the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In view, particularly, of the statement of the Senator from
Vermont about the necessity of radical
changes in the way we do our business
if the administration is going to put
another 100,000 or perhaps 500,000 men
in Vietnam, I ask whether the majority
leader knows or can find out for the
Senate whether or not the administration intends to consult Congress and allow it at least to discuss the matter, in
view of the very dubious basis for the socalled Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
I wonder whether the administration
is contemplating a declaration of war,
upon which would be based the kind of
regulations which the Senator from Vermont just mentioned. It seems to me, if
the administration is going now to undertake a vast new ·escalation, Congress
should at least be consulted and have
an opportunity to express itself.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may
I say that what I have said is based only
on speculation and rumors; stories which
have appeared in the press; a trip last
week by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Wheeler, to Saigon; a
statement issued from Bangkok yester-
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Nothing in the staff report could be reday that it was thought more men
would be needed; a statement given in an motely considered as endangering the seinterview by General Westmoreland to curity of the United States, especially 3%
one of the press associations to the etrect years after the events. Surely the North
that it was thought he would need more Vietnamese know by now what happened-even if it has been withheld from
men.
I would feel that as far as the Presi- the Ame1ican people.
The American people, who are paying
dent is concerned, he will discuss matters of this sort. I know he is very anx- the cost in lives, blood, and money, have
ious to meet with members of the Com- a. right to know.
Secretary McNamara should immedimittee on Foreign Relations, for example,
ately declassify all of the material in the
to discuss matters of mutual interest.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I understand staff report and in the Tonkin Gulf hearthat the majority leader is saying that ing on August 6, 1964. Failing such acthe President has not discussed with tion on the part of the Secretary, the
him such matters as sending another Senate Foreign Relations Committee
100,000 men to Vietnam, nor has he dis- should come before the Senate to declascussed with him his plans in this con- sify the staff report.
Meanwhile, events in South Vietnam
neCtion?
Mr. MANSFIELD. No, nor do I think attest to the utter futility of U.S. policies
he is in a position where, at this time, there.
As the Wall Street Journal stated in its
he can discuss them, because I assume
he is waiting for informa.tton, and on leading editorial on February 23, 1968:
We• thlnk the American people should be
the basis of the information and the recommendations which will be made, then getting ready to accept, l! they haven't althe prospect that the whole Vietnam
he will be face to face with a decision. ready,
may be doomed; it may be ta.J.I!ng apart
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If he has not dis- ell'ort
beneath our !ect.
cusaed it with the ma.jorUy leader, I
take it he has discussed it with no MemCasualty figures published last week
ber of this body. Certainly we have no show that more American fighting men
information 1n the Committee on For- were k1lled in action during the precedeign Relations about these plans.
1ng week-543-tha.n in a.ny other week
It would seem, in view of the disas- of the wa.r. In the 41 days that had
trous situation 1n which we find our- ela.psed during 1968 when the report was
selves, that the Committee on Foreign ma.de, 2,242 American fighting men have
Relations and the Senate should be in- been killed in Vietnam. This is at a rate
formed a.bout the President's plans be- of over 20,000 deaths a year.
fore a decision is made.
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
14'r. MANSFIELD. I am sure a decision MoNTOYA in Ule chair). The Senator's
will be made, and if and when it 1s time has expired.
made, I am sure the Senate will be inMr. GRUENING. I ask unanimous conformed a.t that time. I have no d/ubtsent that I ma.y proceed for 10 additional
that It will.
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
FALSEHOOD F" TT URE AND FUTIL- objection, it is so ordered.
· ~
•
Mr. GRUENING. The events o! the
ITY-THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. POL- lnst 2 weeks have shown conclusively tha t
ICY IN VIEI'NAM
· the repeatedly optimistic reporl.i of GenMr. GROENING. Mr. President, the eral Westmoreland and other high &devents of the past few \\'eeks have dem- ministration officials are, aa they have
onstra.ted ~and a shadow of a. doubt been for the past 4 years, ent1rely basethe utter collapse of U.S. pollcy in South- less.
east AsiA.
Mllltarily the United Sta tes h as l01: t
Faets now coming to ]jght concerning the initiative.
Those opposed to the Saigon regime
the Tonkin Gulf episodes of August 2 and
•. 19M, further widen the so-called credi- have shown conclusively that there can
blllty ga~ The able and distinguished be 80 wety in the streets af any South
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relatioru Vietnamese street, Including thoee of
Committee (Mr. FuLBRIGHT] has stated the nation's capital-Saigon.
Meantime, we have permitted 5,000
that Secretary McNamara's statement
before that committee, as released by marines to become beselged tn the north
Secretary McNamara. is "a classic exam- in an area becoming i.n£reumgly indeple ot selective declasolflcation of security fensible.
And now the call has come !rom GenmateriaL"
eral Westmoreland in Saigon for more
He said further:
American troops.
J:verythlng related to the Tonkin lncldenta
To what end?
l.s •·secret" except that which the Pentagon
deems should be made public. Th!B deceives
the American public.

I

agree.

I have read the so-C&lled top secret
carefully compiled report af the statr of
the Senate Foreign Relations Com.mJttee
and the transcript of the hearing held
before that committee on February 20. A
review of both these documents makes It
clear that Secretary McNamara did not
tell the whole truth, either, when he testifted before the Foreign Relations Committee in August 1964 or when he testified before It on February of this year.

The time has cam&-

The New York Times stated 1n its lead-

ing editorial on February 25, 1968far Americans and their leaders to recognize that the policy Itself 1a Illogical; that 1t
entra.pe the United States in a war without
v1a1ble lllnit.a, despite all omcJ&I. optlmiam;
that 1t w1ll continue to make 1naaUable demands on American mAnpower, reeourcea and
energy tar beyond the worth ot any conceivable gains. The only sound. policy Ia to
move from the battletl.eld to the negotiating
table wtth fullest speed.

The much vaunted pacification program to "win the hearts and minds" of
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the rural population has collapsed as the
pacification teams have been drawn in to
defend the very cities on which their owt:)
security depended.
In September, with a loud fanfare, the
a-dministration, based on rigged electio1.s
and the adoption of a high sounding constitution, announced that democracy had
come to South Vietnam.
That so-called democracy there has
been rapidly deteriorating the last few
days.
The constitution has been suspended.
The corrupt military junta is jailing
the leading opponents in the last election-"protective custody" is what it is
called, a term highly reminiscent of the
same term used in Fascist and Communist countries. It is not surprising that
such term is used in a country, one of the
dominant figures of whom is General Ky,
whose greatest hero is Adolph Hitler.
lp. a moving advertisement in the New
York Times on February 25, 1968, headed
' 'In the Name o! God, Let's Stop It Now,"
inserted by the International Committee
of Conscience on Vietnam of the Fellowship of Reconcil1atlon pointed out thatFirst. The Venerable Thlch Tri Quang,
"widely revered South Vietnamese Buddhist monk" has been placed in "protective custody";
Second. The peace candidates in the
September elections, Au Truong Thanh
and Truong D1nh Dzue, have been placed
In' protective custody";
Third. Many of the 65 Sa.~on University professors who signed an appeal for
a cease-fire and negotiations have been
arrested and the others threatened with
arrest;
Fourth. Seventeen leaders of South
Vietnamese student organizations have
been arrested for appealing for a ceasefire and negotiations;
Fifth. The Roman Cathollc Bishops of
South Vietnam have appealed to both
sides for a cease-fire and the end of
hootlllties and negotiations.
Strict censorship of the press has been
lmpo "'d in South Vietnam.
As Flora Lewis, writing from ~on in
the Washington Post states:
The newspapers here are censored to a
point that &Oinettmes leavea more w111te &pace
than black. rn.ooura.gtng remarks are no'
prln~

Thus the American etrorts to bring
democracy to South vtetnam are recorded in falsehood, fa.1lu.re, and tuttli.ty.
ONJI POIISDILJI IIOLU'rlON TO THJI VlJITNAK
DILl!:MKA

Recommendation8 for extrication of
the United States from Its Vietnamese
folly are not ihe respoosibillt,y of those
who for ye&rS have dii!Sented from United
States pollcy 1n Vietnam. It is the responsibility ~ thoee who got us Into the
Southeast Asia mess.
However, if President Johnson really
wants to get the United States out of the
morass In Vietnam, and save us from
ever-mounting and ever-deepening disaster and the 1ncretils1n& slaughter of the
flower of our youth and of thousands o!
Vietnamese noncombatants, his opportunity iB here and now.
He could go on nationwide radio and
television and. 1n effect, say to the American people:
"Illy fellow cWzens, I have tried for 4
years and my predecessors have tried for

'

